The fact still remains that we shouldn't even be in Iraq in the first place. A fact that our leaders up in Washington still seem to ignore.

Adrift in the Sea of Humility

Apropos :

The crucial point here is not merely that the policy of lying was hardly ever aimed at the enemy (this is one of the reasons why the Papers don't reveal any military secrets that could fall under the Espionage Act) but chiefly if not exclusively destined for domestic consumption, for propaganda at home and especially for the purpose of deceiving Congress; the Tonkin incident where the enemy knew all the facts and the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee none is a case in point.

All these goals existed together, almost in a helter-skelter fashion; none was permitted to cancel its predecessors. For each addressed itself to a different "audience" and for each a different "scenario" had to be produced. McNaughton's much-quoted enumeration of US aims in 1965: "70%: To avoid humiliating defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor). 20%: To keep South Vietnam (and the adjacent territory) from Chinese hands. 10%: To permit the people of South Vietnam to enjoy a better, freer way of life," is refreshing in its honesty but was probably drawn up to bring some order and clarity into the debates on the forever troublesome question of why we were conducting a war in Vietnam of all places.

It's also helpful from time to time to go back and read the manifesto that got us into this mess in the first place. It seems our liar in chief likes to pick and choose which parts to pay attention to and which parts to ignore.

In the geniuses' own words (emphasis added):

The Price of American Preeminence

[..]We have advocated a force posture
and service structure that diverges
significantly both from current plans and
alternatives advanced in other studies. We
believe it is necessary to increase slightly
the personnel strength of U.S. forces – many
of the missions associated with patrolling
the expanding American security perimeter
are manpower-intensive, and planning for
major theater wars must include the ability
for politically decisive campaigns including
extended post-combat stability operations.
Also, this expanding perimeter argues
strongly for new overseas bases and forward
operating locations to facilitate American
political and military operations around the
world.

At the same time, we have argued that
established constabulary missions can be
made less burdensome on soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines and less burdensome on
overall U.S. force structure by a more
sensible forward-basing posture; long-term
security commitments should not be
supported by the debilitating, short-term
rotation of units except as a last resort. In
Europe, the Persian Gulf and East Asia,
enduring U.S. security interests argue
forcefully for an enduring American military
presence. Pentagon policy-makers must
adjust their plans to accommodate these
realities and to reduce the wear and tear on
service personnel. We have also argued that
the services can begin now to create new,
more flexible units and military
organizations that may, over time, prove to
be smaller than current organizations, even
for peacekeeping and constabulary
operations.

Even as American military forces patrol
an expanding security perimeter, we believe
it essential to retain sufficient forces based
in the continental United States capable of
rapid reinforcement and, if needed, applying
massive combat power to stabilize a region
in crisis or to bring a war to a successful
conclusion. There should be a strong
strategic synergy between U.S. forces
overseas and in a reinforcing posture: units
operating abroad are an indication of
American geopolitical interests and
leadership, provide significant military
power to shape events and, in wartime,
create the conditions for victory when
reinforced. Conversely, maintaining the
ability to deliver an unquestioned “knockout
punch” through the rapid introduction of
stateside units will increase the shaping
power of forces operating overseas and the
vitality of our alliances. In sum, we see an
enduring need for large-scale American
forces.

But while arguing for improvements in
today’s armed services and force posture,
we are unwilling to sacrifice the ability to
maintain preeminence in the longer term. If
the United States is to maintain its
preeminence – and the military revolution
now underway is already an American-led
revolution – the Pentagon must begin in
earnest to transform U.S. military forces.

We elected the Democrats, gave them control of Congress,to end the war, and they did not, though they could have and can.

George Bush now has the measure of them, unfortunately for us. Cowards can smell their own kind.

It does put his mendacity in perspective, however, i.e., is he any worse for continuing the war than the democrats who will not end it?