The NYT had an interesting series of articles and editorials yesterday regarding the options being discussed for Iraq.

Read more after the jump...

The lead article, "In Search of the Fixers", gets to the root of the problem as has been discussed here before:

In America, generals, congressmen and commentators across the political spectrum are embroiled in a debate over troop levels and exit timetables. But if the United States seeks to establish stability so its troops can leave, it must answer the question: whom does it talk to?

Which Sunni and Shiite militias, armed tribal groups and even criminal gangs need to be fought? Which can be bargained with? Which are potential allies as the United States seeks to break the increasingly chaotic cycles of attack, revenge and rivalry for turf and spoils?

This editorial, "Learning from Iraq", provides clues about why it has taken the U.S. six years under the failed Rumsfeld doctrine to figure this out:

The field manual, the Army’s basic guidebook for war, peacekeeping and counterinsurgency, quietly jettisons the single most disastrous innovation of the Rumsfeld era. That is the misconceived notion that the size and composition of an American intervention force should be based only on what is needed to defeat the organized armed forces of an enemy government, instead of also taking into account the needs of providing security and stability for the civilian population for which the United States will then be responsible.

Almost every post-invasion problem in Iraq can be directly traced to this one catastrophic planning failure, which left too few troops in Iraq to prevent rampant looting, restore basic services and move decisively against the insurgency before it took root and spread.

The editorial also discusses training deficiencies involving both Iraqi forces and American trainers. This is best summed up by a frustrated American officer, who said "I went there with the wrong attitude and I thought I understood Iraq and the history because I had seen PowerPoint slides, but I really didn’t."

Bush must have seen the same PowerPoint. Rumsfeld has no excuse, as evidenced by the famous photo of him being warmly greeted by and shaking hands with Saddam in 1983.

Another concern that hasn't been widely discussed is the Bush Administration's insistence on deferring to the commanders "on the ground" (are we sick of that phrase yet?). The military's mission is to destroy the enemy, not create governments. Where has the political component been, and why wasn't it already in place before the invasion?

Possibly as a result of the election, or maybe because Bush is finally getting the message that America wants answers, the discussion of political realities in Iraq is finally moving onto the front pages and the evening news.

This articles, "Boost the Force, Stay Steady or..." summarizes the various options being discussed:

While Mr. Bush awaits word from the Iraq Study Group, the bipartisan council charged with evaluating war strategy, a national debate rages. What follows are some of the major competing plans to stabilize Iraq as advocated by politicians, former officials and others.

Some lean optimistic: General John P. Abizaid, the top American commander in the Middle East, made a case to Congress to continue the administration’s policy, with adjustments as necessary. (But he added that time was short, with only four to six months left to calm Iraq.)

Henry A. Kissinger, the former secretary of state, offered a much bleaker view, suggesting in a BBC interview broadcast last week that an overall military success in Iraq was no longer possible.

Many are waiting for the recommendations from the Iraq Study Group, which is led by a former secretary of state, James A. Baker III, and a former Democratic congressman, Lee Hamilton. The group is expected to issue its report next month.

Meanwhile, grim milestones accumulate. As of today, the American fighting in Iraq exceeds the time of American involvement in World War II.

The article's accompanying graphic has thoughts from influential players. Sen. John McCain and Gen. John Abizaid think there is still a military solution. Sen. Carl Levin isn't so sure. Here's a summary:

Sen. John McCain: Additional troops to control the insurgency. Withdrawal or a timetable would lead to chaos and involvement by Iran and Syria. Has not elaborated his views on political solutions, saying Iraq must first be secure and stable.

Gen. John Abizaid: We have sufficient troop strength. Might be slightly increased to improve training the Iraqi Army. Does not rule out larger troop increase, but says the U.S. military is stretched too thin and that it might dissuade the Iraqis from taking responsibility for their own security. Rejects the notion of three Iraqi states, says Al Qaeda would take over the Sunni state and Iran would dominate the Shia state.

Sen. Carl Levin: Begin phased withdrawal of U.S. troops, with some remaining to protect Americans and train Iraqis. Says the U.S. cannot impose an American political solution, has advocated partitioning but hasn't discussed specifics.

There are other interesting views in the sidebar:

William Kristol: Immediate increase of U.S. troops in Iraq by 50,000 to "clear and hold Baghdad," and "rapid steps to increase the overall American ground forces" to meet the new deployment needs. (From one of the great military genius minds that helped get us into this.)

Henry Kissinger: A clear-cut military victory is no longer achievable, but withdrawing American forces might lead to civil war worse than Yugoslavia. Favors bringing Syria and Iran in an international conference discussion of Iraq's future."

Barack Obama: Start reducing U.S. troops in the next four to six months, saying "all the troops in the world won't be able to force Shia, Sunni, and Kurd to sit down at a table" to resolve their differences and forge a lasting peace. (Does Barak Obama seem a little shallow and irrelevant sometimes?)

Sen. Joe Biden: Proposes division of Iraq along ething and religious lines, with a Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite states with their own domestic laws and internal security. A central government in Baghdad would control borders, foreign affairs, and oil revenues, with multisectarian and international police protection for the population of Baghdad.

During the election, the GOP tried to characterize Democrats as having no plan for Iraq. From all the remarks above, who seems to have at least thought about a plan? In my opinion, it isn't the "stay the course" (plus a new "escalation" clause) Bush Administration or their apologists.

At any rate, there are indications that the GOP and the Bush Administration are going to use the Democrat's success in the election to dump the problem in their laps, perhaps in the cynical (and deadly for U.S. troops) belief that the Democrats will screw it up even worse so the GOP can swoop in and save the day in Nov. 2008. How do you think it will play out? Will the new Democratic Congress have enough power, authority, and/or ideas to find a solution?