So you are unable to cite any facts to back your claim. I'll help you out:

In this memorandum, we discuss key features of the CRA and present results from our analysis of several data sources regarding the volume and performance of CRA-related mortgage lending. In the end, our analysis on balance runs counter to the contention that the CRA contributed in any substantive way to the current crisis.

Since 1995, there has been essentially no change in basic CRA rules or the
enforcement process that can be reasonably linked to subprime lending
activity.

Analysis of 2006 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data indicates that two-thirds of mortgage loans (first-lien home purchase and refinance loans for site-built properties) are entirely unrelated to CRA; these loans were extended to middle- or higher-income borrowers or to borrowers located outside of lower-income neighborhoods (table 1). These data also indicate that only ten percent of all loans are “CRA-related” — that is, lower-income loans made by banks and their affiliates in their CRA assessment areas.

More important for this discussion is CRA’s relationship to subprime mortgage lending. As shown table 2, in 2005 and 2006, the peak years of subprime volume, independent mortgage companies (institutions not covered by the CRA) accounted for about half of all higher-priced loans (our proxy for subprime lending derived from HMDA data).

Also, 57 percent of all higher-priced loans in 2006 were effectively unrelated to CRA because they were made to non-lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods (table 3). Most importantly, only 6 percent of all higher-priced loans in 2006 were made by CRA-covered institutions or their affiliates to lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods in their assessment areas.

Another way to measure the likely effects of the CRA on the subprime crisis
is by examining foreclosure activity across neighborhoods classified by
income. Data made available by RealtyTrac on foreclosure filings from
January 2006 through August 2008 indicates that most foreclosure filings
(e.g. about 70 percent in 2006) have taken place in middle- or higher-income
neighborhoods and that foreclosure filings have increased at a faster pace in
middle- or higher-income areas than in lower-income areas that are the focus
of the CRA.

Taken together, the available evidence to date does not lend support to the argument that CRA is a root cause of the subprime crisis.

Source: The Federal Reserve. Thanks for playing!

I apologize for being rude; I should not use derogatory descriptions, I’m sorry.

Cause and Effect
Government Policies and the Financial Crisis By Peter J. Wallison

The Community Reinvestment Act

As originally enacted in 1977, the CRA was a vague mandate for regulators to "consider" whether an insured bank was serving the needs of the whole community it was supposed to serve. The "community" itself was not defined, and the act stated only that it was intended to "encourage" banks to meet community needs. It was enforced through the denial of applications for such things as mergers and acquisitions. The act also stated that serving community needs had to be done within the context of safe and sound lending practices, language that Congress probably inserted to ensure that the law would not be seen as a form of credit allocation. Although the act was adopted to prevent "redlining"--the practice of refusing loans to otherwise qualified borrowers in low-income areas--it also contained language that included small business, agriculture, and similar groups among the interests that had to be served. With the vague compliance standard that required banks only to be "encouraged" and their performance to be "considered," the act was invoked relatively infrequently when banks applied for permission to merge or another regulatory approval, until the Clinton administration.[1]

The decisive turn in the act's enforcement occurred in 1993 and was probably induced by the substantial amount of media and political attention that had been paid to the Boston Federal Reserve Bank's 1992 study of discrimination in home mortgage lending.[2] The study concluded that while there was no overt discrimination in the allocation of mortgage funds, more subtle forms of discrimination existed in which whites received better treatment by loan officers than members of minorities. The methodology of the study has since been questioned,[3] but it seems to have been highly influential with regulators and members of the incoming Clinton administration at the time of its publication. In 1993, bank regulators initiated a major effort to reform the CRA regulations. Some of the context in which this was occurring can be gleaned from the following statement by Attorney General Janet Reno in January 1994: "[W]e will tackle lending discrimination wherever and in whatever form it appears. No loan is exempt, no bank is immune. For those who thumb their nose at us, I promise vigorous enforcement."[4]
The regulators' effort culminated in new rules adopted in May 1995 that would be phased in fully by July 1997. The new rules attempted to establish objective criteria for determining whether a bank was meeting the standards of the CRA, taking much of the discretion out of the hands of the examiners. "The emphasis on performance-based evaluation," A. K. M. Rezaul Hossain, an economist at Mount Saint Mary College, writes, "can be thought of as a shift of emphasis from procedural equity to equity in outcome. In that, it is not sufficient for lenders to prove elaborate community lending efforts directed towards borrowers in the community, but an evenhanded distribution of loans across LMI [low and moderate income] and non-LMI areas and borrowers."[5] In other words, it was now necessary for banks to show that they had actually made the requisite loans, not just that they were trying to find qualified borrowers. In this connection, one of the standards in the new regulations required the use of "innovative or flexible" lending practices to address credit needs of LMI borrowers and neighborhoods.[6] Thus, a law that was originally intended to encourage banks to use safe and sound practices in lending now required them to be innovative and flexible--a clear requirement for the relaxation of lending standards.
There is very little data available on the performance of loans made under the CRA. The subject has become so politicized in light of the housing meltdown and its effect on the general economy that most reports--favorable or unfavorable--should probably be discounted. Before the increases in housing prices that began in 2001, reviews of the CRA were generally unfavorable. The act increased costs for banks, and there was an inverse relationship between their CRA lending and their regulatory ratings.[7] One of the few studies of CRA lending in comparison to normal lending was done by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, which reported in 2000 that "respondents who did report differences [between regular and CRA housing loans] most often said they had lower prices or higher costs or credit losses for CRA-related home purchase and refinance loans than for others."[8] Much CRA lending after 2000 occurred during a period of enormous growth in housing values, which tended to suppress the number of defaults and reduce loss rates.
The important question, however, is not the default rates on the mortgages made under the CRA. Whatever those rates might be, they were not sufficient to cause a worldwide financial crisis. The most important fact associated with the CRA is the effort to reduce underwriting standards so that more low-income people could purchase homes. Once these standards were relaxed--particularly allowing loan-to-value ratios higher than the 80 percent that had previously been the norm--they spread rapidly to the prime market and to subprime markets where loans were made by lenders other than insured banks. The effort to reduce mortgage underwriting standards was led by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through the National Homeownership Strategy published in 1994 in response to a request by President Clinton. Among other things, it called for "financing strategies, fueled by the creativity and resources of the private and public sectors to help homeowners that lack cash to buy a home or to make the payments."[9] Many subsequent studies have documented the rise in loan-to-value ratios and other indicators of loosened lending standards.[10]
After 1995 and the adoption of the new CRA regulations, homeownership in the United States grew rapidly. Having remained at 64 percent for almost twenty-five years, it grew to 69 percent between 1995 and 2005.[11] The increased availability of credit under CRA requirements probably also spurred housing demand, which doubled home prices between 1995 and 2007.[12] The key question, however, is the effect of relaxed lending standards on lending standards in non-CRA markets. In principle, it would seem impossible--if down payment or other requirements were being relaxed for loans in minority-populated or other underserved areas--to limit the benefits only to those borrowers. Inevitably, the relaxed standards banks were enjoined to adopt under CRA would be spread to the wider market--including to prime mortgage markets and to speculative borrowers. Bank regulators, who were in charge of enforcing CRA standards, could hardly disapprove of similar loans made to better qualified borrowers. This is exactly what occurred. Writing in December 2007 for the Milken Institute, four scholars observed: "Over the past decade, most, if not all, the products offered to subprime borrowers have also been offered to prime borrowers. In fact, during the period from January 1999 through July 2007, prime borrowers obtained thirty-one of the thirty-two types of mortgage products--fixed-rate, adjust-able rate and hybrid mortgages, including those with balloon payments--obtained by subprime borrowers."[13]
The fact that Fannie and Freddie were permitted--indeed encouraged--to grow after the S&Ls collapsed speaks volumes about the inability of congressional lawmakers to learn any lessons from the past.
Sure enough, according to data published by the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, from 2001 through 2006, the share of all mortgage originations that were made up of conventional mortgages (that is, the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage that had always been the mainstay of the U.S. mortgage market) fell from 57.1 percent in 2001 to 33.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2006. Correspondingly, subprime loans (those made to borrowers with blemished credit) rose from 7.2 percent to 18.8 percent, and Alt-A loans (those made to speculative buyers or without the usual underwriting standards) rose from 2.5 percent to 13.9 percent. Although it is difficult to prove cause and effect, it seems highly likely that the lower lending standards banks were required to adopt under the CRA influenced what they and other lenders were willing to offer to borrowers in prime markets. Needless to say, most borrowers would prefer a mortgage with a low down payment requirement, allowing them to buy a larger home for the same initial investment. There is nothing immoral about this; if the opportunity is there, most families can think of better uses for their savings than making a large down payment for a home.
The problem is summed up succinctly by Stan Liebowitz of the University of Texas at Dallas: "From the current handwringing, you'd think that the banks came up with the idea of looser underwriting standards on their own, with regulators just asleep on the job. In fact, it was the regulators who relaxed these standards--at the behest of community groups and ‘progressive' political forces. . . . For years, rising house prices hid the default problems since quick refinances were possible. But now that house prices have stopped rising, we can clearly see the damage done by relaxed loan standards."[14] The point here is not that low-income borrowers received mortgage loans that they could not afford; that is probably true to some extent but cannot account for the large number of subprime and Alt-A loans that currently pollute the banking system. It was the spreading of these looser underwriting standards to the prime loan market that encouraged the huge increase in credit availability for mortgages, the speculation in housing, and ultimately the bubble in housing prices.

didn't the zionist conspiracy buy it out about the same time the masons put the mark of the beast on u.s. currency?

Andy, I totally agree. Allen Greenspan was / is part of the problem. And let me preface my comment by stating I am neither a democrat nor republican. I’m someone who works two full time jobs; 70 plus hours each week trying to make ends meet. I think the system is broken. The only proof I have is that the system is truly busted broken down like an old AMC Pacer.

Regulation by whom? The SEC…the same regulators that knew about Bernie Madoff since the late 90’s and did nothing about his ponzi scheme? I’m surprised they caught up with the Clinton / Pelosi lover Allen Stanford. Or maybe we should have Chris Dodd over see the regulations or Barney Frank? Is no one concerned that golden spoon crew that specializes in self-preservation and mediocrity is creeping into every aspect of your life?

I hate to disappoint but if I were a master of the bond market my safety deposit box would not be heaped full of gold.